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ABSTRACT 
 
FUNHOUSE MIRRORS: 
DO POLLS REFLECT PUBLIC OPINION OR REFRACT DEMOCRACY? 
 
Michael Matthew Ragozzino, B.A. Harvard University 
 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
Chairperson:  Todd Hartman 
 
 The news media’s dissemination of public opinion polls has increased exponentially 
over the past decade. While most citizens treat polls as reliable sources of information upon 
which to base their political decisions, political scientists have decried polls as plagued by 
inaccuracies and biases. This paper investigates the impact of what is known as the 
“bandwagon effect,” the tendency for people to modify their beliefs in order to conform to 
the majority opinion presented by a poll. Drawing from social identity theory and self-
categorization theory, I hypothesize that the bandwagon effect impacts those individuals who 
seek to enhance their connection to their national and political groups. I further hypothesize 
that the strength of group opinion moderates the impact of the bandwagon effect. With three 
unique experiments, I find that social identity does, in fact, moderate the impact of 
bandwagon effect. Self-identified political partisans change their attitudes to conform to 
those of their fellow Republicans or Democrats. Interestingly, Americans do not change their 
attitudes to conform to the opinions of their fellow Americans. I also find that the strength of 
group opinion does not moderate the impact of the bandwagon effect, and that people who 
change their attitudes are unaware of the influence of the opinion poll. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During a March 2010 episode of The Colbert Report, comedian Stephen Colbert used 
a meat grinder to describe the production and distribution of public opinion polls. Like 
unprocessesd meat that is stuffed into intestinal tubing, Colbert claimed, public opinion is 
“neatly packaged for consumption” by “truth grinders” who “boil down public opinion to 
authoritative sounding numbers.” He then selected a few choice links and fed them back into 
the grinder to illustrate how pundits and partisan media outlets “select those results that 
support (their) opinions, then…go on T.V. to tell you how you feel, which you feed back into 
the next poll.” He concluded: “You (the public) jam the previous opinions (they have) told 
you about back into the circle…and eventually there is just one opinion feeding back on 
itself” (Colbert, 2010). 
Far more than meaty fodder for late night comedy bits, the notion that polling data 
influences the political opinions of the public has long been debated by political scientists. In 
1945, Bernays described what he labeled the “bandwagon effect,” as the tendency for people 
to modify their beliefs in order to conform to the majority opinion presented by a poll (1945). 
Considering the exponential rise in the news media’s use of public opinion polls since the 
mid-1990s (Igo, 2007; Streb & Genovese, 2004; Shiraev & Sobel, 2006), and the emergence 
of decidedly partisan news pundits and media outlets (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 
2009) that can pick and choose which polls to present, a thorough analysis of the bandwagon 
effect has never been more needed. In the following, I discuss the theoretical background of 
the bandwagon effect, explore the literature on the psychological mechanisms that may 
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underlie the bandwagon effect, including social identity theory and self-categorization 
theory, and detail the results of three unique experiments on the bandwagon effect’s impact 
on public opinion regarding political issues. I find strong evidence that the bandwagon effect 
does impact individual opinion, but only when an individual receives polling data that 
reflects the opinion of his or her self-identified political party. In other words, people change 
their positions on political issues in order to conform to the reported opinions of their fellow 
Republicans or Democrats. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Polls as “Heuristics” and Their Potential Effects 
Research has consistently demonstrated that Americans lack basic knowledge about 
both their political leaders and their political system (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 
1992). In order to overcome this lack of knowledge, citizens rely on shortcuts, or heuristics, 
to make voting decisions and form positions on political issues (Bartels, 2008; Lupia, 1994; 
Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Mutz, 1992; Popkin, 1991). Common heuristics include party 
affiliation (Lodge & Hamill, 1986; Rahn, 1993), ideology (Conover & Feldman, 1986), and 
the endorsements of political elites, members of the media, and interest organizations 
(Carmines & Kuklinski, 1990; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). As the primary provider 
of heuristic cues to a public that often finds itself far removed from day to day politics, the 
media play a tremendous role in shaping the perceptions of the public (Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987). In this context, the media’s presentation of opinion polls provides citizens with their 
primary means of conceptualizing public opinion. Researchers have demonstrated that 
citizens often use poll results as heuristics to make political decisions (Bartels, 1988; Ceci & 
Kain, 1982; Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2002; Mutz, 1992). In fact, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) list 
public opinion polls as one of the five most commonly used political heuristics.  
However, because of the tendency for political elites and the media to manipulate 
polling data by asking leading questions or cherry picking which polls to disseminate, 
political scholars have long worried about the harmful effects that public opinion polls may 
have on democracy (Jacobs & Shapiro, 1995-96; Lippman, 1925; Polsby & Wildavsky,
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1980; West, 1991). As far back as 1945, Bernays railed against the less-than-savory tactics 
employed by pollsters. Claiming that the public and many political leaders accept polls as 
“the voice of God and the will of the people,” he argued that opinion polls often stand-in for 
true democracy, quieting dissenting voices, curtailing open discussion, and cutting off
opportunities for compromise (Bernays, p. 264). Recent studies of the polls currently 
presented by the media do little to quiet the fears of earlier scholars. These studies have 
shown, consistently, that the media tend to make poll results appear overly precise and 
scientific when they are often plagued by inaccuracies or biases (Franklin, 2003; Herbst, 
1993; Igo, 2007; Jackman, 2005; Lau, 1994). 
An example from early 2010 illustrates the potential danger of the media’s less-than-
rigorous dissemination of polling numbers. As a heated debate raged in Congress over the 
Democrats’ proposed health care reform bill, pollsters bombarded the public. When posed as 
“Obamacare” in opinion surveys, the legislation was soundly rejected by the American 
public. However, key individual provisions of the bill received strong support from the 
American public. According to a Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International in February of 2010, 76% of Americans believed that insurance 
companies should be prohibited from denying coverage to patients with pre-existing 
conditions; 59% believed that lower and lower-middle class Americans deserved some form 
of government-subsidized health insurance; and 59% believed that insurance companies 
should be prohibited from dropping patients who had become economic liabilities. Even the 
most vilified of the legislation’s proposals, the inclusion of a public option that would allow 
citizens to purchase health insurance directly from the government, received the support of 
50% of Americans (Teixeira, 2010). Yet the majority of polling numbers broadcast by the 
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media highlighted one devastating number: 49% of Americans disapproved of “Obamacare.” 
Fox News reported the number at 55% (Blanton, 2010). Thus the polling information 
disseminated to the public reflected public opinion on the health care bill no more accurately 
than a funhouse mirror. Most citizens went about their daily business believing that most 
other citizens opposed the new health care law. Did the public respond to opinion poll reports 
in the manner described by Colbert? That is, did citizens “jump on the bandwagon” and 
amend their initial positions to conform to those supposedly held by the majority of the 
public? The polls may not have accurately reflected opinion, but did they refract it? If so, 
whose opinions did they refract?  
The Bandwagon Effect on the Voting Decision 
Unfortunately, much of the research on what Bernays labeled the “bandwagon effect” 
has focused on the impact of opinion polls on citizens’ voting decisions, rather than their 
political attitudes, and has returned mixed results. In 1962, for example, Dizney and Roskens 
conducted the first experimental test of the bandwagon effect’s influence on voting behavior. 
In a mock election, the researchers asked respondents to vote for a candidate (Kennedy or 
Nixon) with no information other than manipulated poll results. The experiment found no 
evidence of the bandwagon effect (Dizney & Roskens, 1962). Over the following two 
decades, a variety of researchers ran similar experiments and returned the same null results 
(Cantril, 1980; Fleitas, 1971; Laponce, 1966; Navazio, 1977; Tyson & Kaplowitz, 1977). 
Quasi-experimental tests (Fuchs, 1966; Lang & Lang, 1968; Mendehlson, 1966; Tuchman & 
Coffin, 1972) as well as non-experimental approaches (Teer & Spence, 1973; Beniger, 1976; 
and Johnston, 1990) also reached the same conclusion. In the 1980s, however, four studies 
indicated some support for the bandwagon effect in electoral scenarios (Bartels, 1985, 1987, 
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1988; Skalaban, 1988). Since then, researchers have also shown that polls have statistically 
significant effects on the preferences of primary voters (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994) and 
on public perceptions of a candidate’s character (Hardy & Jamieson, 2005). 
The Bandwagon Effect on Public Policy Preferences 
Curiously, despite Bernays’ initial warning that polling numbers affect attitudes, 
political scientists continue to focus on their effects on voting behavior. This persistent focus 
on the electoral effects of polls ignores the effect of public opinion on public policy 
independent of the voting context. In their foundational work on the issue, Page and Shapiro 
(1983) point to a multitude of instances in which an overwhelming change in public opinion 
led directly to sweeping policy changes. Among others, public support for the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 increased from 54% to 66% prior to the passage of the legislation. Public 
support for a woman’s right to choose increased 32% from December of 1965 to April of 
1972 when the Supreme Court handed down its decision on Roe v. Wade. Likewise, public 
support for admitting China to the United Nations Security Council rose 33% from 1964 to 
1971, when President Nixon dramatically changed the nation’s foreign policy stance toward 
China. “When Americans’ policy preferences shift,” Page and Shapiro concluded, “it is 
likely that congruent changes (in policy) follow” (p. 175).  
 Echoing the findings of Page and Shapiro (1983), Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 
(1995) asserted that policy responds “drastically” to changes in public opinion. Wlezien 
(1996) declared that research reveals a clear linkage between changes in public preference 
and changes in public policy. Hays, Esler, and Hays (1996) found that state environmental 
regulation is “quite responsive” to public opinion. Erickson, Wright, and McIver (1993) went 
a bit further and called the correlation between opinion and policy in the American system 
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“awesome.” In a definitive study that examined public opinion and policy data for the United 
States from 1935-1975, Burstein (2003) found that three-quarters of the relationships 
between opinion and policy were statistically significant, leading him to declare that “far 
more than just a linkage exists—policy is affected by opinion most of the time” (Burstein, 
34).  
Of course, public opinion does not translate into public policy without the actions of 
political elites. Once politicians sense a change in public opinion, they adjust their policy 
positions accordingly in order to increase their chances of reelection, a phenomenon known 
as “rational anticipation” (Stimson, 1999; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erickson, 1995). Thus, 
politicians constantly seek data on public opinion in order to fully understand the shifting 
moods of the electorate (Entman, 2004; Stimson, Mackuen, & Erickson, 1995). Politicians 
rely on a number of sources for information on the public mood, including lobbyists, interest 
groups, and constituent contacts (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Leech, 2009; 
Wright, 2003), but no sources are more accessible or more widely used than public opinion 
polls (Herbst, 1998; Klotzer, 2008; Monroe, 1998; Page, Shapiro, & Dempsey, 1987). In the 
21
st
 century, Americans are now, more than ever, bombarded by polling data compiled and 
presented by groups with a vast array of motivations. If the bandwagon effect is, indeed, a 
viable phenomenon, then it affects not only public opinion but also policymakers’ 
perceptions of public opinion. Thus, considering the strong linkage between public opinion 
and public policy, the impact of polling data on public opinion certainly deserves more 
rigorous inspection. 
Presently, however, only a handful of studies have focused on the bandwagon effect 
in the context of public policy preferences. In an experiment that presented respondents with 
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manipulated polling data about political issues (abortion rights and the constitutional future 
of Quebec) rather than political candidates, researchers found strong support for the 
bandwagon effect (Cloutier, Guay, & Nadeau, 1993). Even though respondents held 
crystallized opinions about abortion and few opinions about the constitutional issue, the 
bandwagon effect had a similar influence on both. Polarization increased 7% in the direction 
of the experimental stimulus on the former and 5% on the latter. Another study, conducted in 
Belgium in 2010, tested the impact of the bandwagon effect across five non-electoral issues. 
The researchers found that while polling information did affect perceptions of collective 
opinion, personal opinions on political issues remained unaffected (Sonck & Loosveldt, 
2010). 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 As is the case with much political science, the results of the studies on the bandwagon 
effect remain inconclusive. The reconciliation of the divergent conclusions from the 
Canadian and Belgium studies may provide a clue to the psychological mechanisms 
underlying the bandwagon effect. In other words, we must ask ourselves, how and when 
might the bandwagon effect impact public opinion? 
If citizens do, in fact, alter their positions on political issues to conform to the opinion 
of the perceived majority—that is, if they experience the bandwagon effect—they do so out 
of a desire to conform. Social identity and self-categorization theorists posit that the benefits 
of identifying with a certain group often motivate individuals to change their beliefs or 
behaviors in order to conform to group norms (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The act of joining a specific group allows an 
individual to forge an identity based on solidarity rather than alienation (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955). The act of conforming to that group’s social norms—including its political beliefs—
produces positive emotions, including an increase in self-esteem, a feeling of belonging, and 
a sense of meaning in an otherwise meaningless world (Christiansen, Rothberger, & Wood, 
2004; Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg, & Duck, 1999; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999; 
Wellen, Hogg, & Terry, 1998). 
In terms of bandwagon effect, then, individuals who identify with a certain group will 
modify their beliefs to conform to those of the group in order to bolster their feelings of 
social meaning. As Cohen (2003) claims: often, “social meaning is not inferred but 
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transmitted. It is defined by the judgments of other individuals who are trusted to share one’s 
moral allegiances” (p. 809). In light of this, the seemingly contradictory findings of the 
Canadian and Belgium studies are not contradictory at all. Whereas the Canadian study 
presented subjects with the opinions of “fellow Canadians,” the Belgium study presented 
subjects with the opinions of “others.” In other words, the opinion polls presented in 
Canadian study primed subjects to consider their social identity, while those in the Belgium 
study did not. Thus, taken together, the two studies lend support for the notion that the 
bandwagon effect is moderated by social identity.  
Studies of the effects of social identity on attitudes have illuminated a few key points 
as to how it works. First, the attitude issue in question must be salient to an individual’s 
group (e.g., one’s political affiliation would not affect evaluations of which film should win 
the Academy Award) (Cohen, 2003). Second, the degree to which an individual identifies 
with a group moderates the extent of that individual’s attitude conformity—high group 
identifiers are more likely to change their initial beliefs than low group identifiers 
(Christiansen et al., 2004). Third, because most people believe that they base their decisions 
on objective analysis of the salient facts of an issue (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002), they are 
unaware of the influence of groups (Cohen, 2003). No studies, however, have tested these 
findings in the specific context of the bandwagon effect and opinion polls. Thus, I offer the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Americans will modify their positions on a political issue to coincide 
with the positions of a majority of fellow Americans. 
Of course, in today’s American political environment, no group identity is more 
salient to an individual’s evaluation of political issues than his or her political party 
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identification. Research has revealed that the American electorate has recently become more 
polarized across a range of social, economic, and moral issues than at point since the 1950s 
(Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Brewer, 2005; Jacobson, 
2011). In fact, during the 2000 and 2004 elections, self-identified partisans remained faithful 
to their parties to a greater extent than during any other elections in history, and Republicans 
and Democrats remain consistently far apart in their evaluations of both President George W. 
Bush and President Obama (Jacobson, 2011; Jones, 2010). The research linking partisanship 
to social identity is both copious and clear. Conover and Feldman (1981), claim that 
individuals choose their partisanship and ideology before making decisions on political 
issues. Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier (1995) claim that we should “expect predictions 
from social identity theory to be most applicable to ethnic, religious, [and] political” 
identities (p. 286). With a unique experiment, Hartman and Weber (2009) demonstrate that 
an individual’s ideological identification moderates his or her evaluation of political issues, 
leading them to conclude that “simply knowing how a fellow partisan stands on a political 
issue is often sufficient in forming a belief” (p. 540). If social identity does moderate the 
impact of the bandwagon effect, polls reporting the opinions of partisans should influence the 
attitudes of fellow partisans and have little effect on the attitudes of political independents. 
Thus, I offer the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Self-identified partisans will modify their positions on a political issue 
to coincide with the positions of a majority of their fellow partisans. 
Hypothesis 2a. Self-identified independents will not modify their positions on a 
political issue to coincide with the positions of self-identified partisans. 
12 
 
Additionally, no studies have tested whether or not the magnitude of a group’s 
support or opposition for an issue impacts the extent of attitude change. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that as group opinion grows more uniform, a group member will 
experience greater social pressure to conform. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: Group members will modify their positions on political issues to a 
greater extent when group opinion is strong rather than weak. 
Finally, because research has shown that people are often unaware of the influence of 
group cues on their decisions (Cohen, 2003), I suspect that individuals do not realize that 
they use opinion polls as group-cues, or heuristics, for making political decisions . In other 
words: 
Hypothesis 4: Group members who modify their positions to conform to group 
opinion will not recognize the impact of group opinion on their beliefs. 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH AND RESULTS 
Study 1 
 
Data 
 
 A total of 230 subjects were recruited on-line via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), which is a web-based platform that allows researchers to pay subjects a nominal 
fee to perform basic tasks (for a more detailed description of this type of sample, see 
Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2010; Paolacci & Ipeirrotis, 2010). As with other web-based 
samples, the data are skewed toward younger, White, liberal, Democratic respondents. Fifty-
five percent of subjects were male, and ages ranged from 18 to 75 years old (median age = 31 
years old). Eighty-five percent of respondents identified their race as White, 6% as Asian, 
4% as African American, 4% as Latino, and the remaining subjects selected “Other.” Thirty-
nine percent identified themselves as Democrats, 17% as Republicans, and 46% as 
Independents. A 5-point measure of ideological orientation revealed that 42% of the sample 
held liberal views, 41% moderate views, and 17% conservative views. Forty-eight percent of 
subjects reported that they had earned a bachelor’s degree or higher. The sample includes 
respondents from 42 states and the District of Columbia. 
Procedure 
To test the effects of opinion polls on policy attitudes, I employed a between-subjects 
design, in which participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental 
conditions. First, all subjects were asked to read a fictional news article about the Trans-
14 
 
Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is a multilateral free trade agreement between the U.S. and 
nine other Asian-Pacific countries (for the exact wording, see Appendix A). After reading a 
brief description of the TPP, subjects then read a series of arguments for and against the plan 
with the purpose of minimizing the ideological appeal of either side. In addition, the article 
highlighted the Congressional intra-party disagreement over the TPP, thus preventing 
subjects from deriving any party-based cues from the text. The first five paragraphs of the 
article were the same across all experimental groups; the sixth paragraph contained the key 
experimental manipulation describing the results of a recently conducted public opinion poll 
along with a graphical depiction of those results (except for those in the control condition). 
The key experimental manipulation concerned the extent to which fellow Americans 
supported the TPP (e.g., a “slight majority,” or 54%, vs. a “large majority,” or 76%). After 
subjects in the treatment groups viewed the polling information, they completed a brief post-
article questionnaire designed to assess their support for the proposed free trade agreement. 
Subjects then answered a series of demographic questions regarding their age, gender, race, 
and citizenship status. Finally, they answered eight items designed to assess their political 
knowledge. 
Measures 
 Dependent variable. The primary dependent variable is a three-item scale created to 
gauge subjects’ attitudes toward the TPP. Subjects were asked: “Do you support or oppose 
the United States joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership?” The two remaining scale items were 
anchored by the following endpoints: 1) “very good idea” and “very bad idea,” and 2) “very 
positive” and “very negative.” The first item was measured on a five-point scale, and the two 
follow-up items were measured on seven-point scales. This created a composite index that 
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could range from 3 (very negative attitudes toward the U.S. joining the TPP) to 19 (very 
positive attitudes). For ease of interpretation, the resulting variable was then rescaled from 0 
to 1 (α = 0.94, M = 0.52, SD = 0.23), as were all independent variables (except for age). 
 Independent variables. Subjects’ self-reported partisanship and ideology were 
measured using 5-point scales (1 = strong Republicans; 1 = very conservative). Political 
knowledge was measured using eight general knowledge questions about politics (KR-20 = 
0.77, M = 0.65, SD = 0.28). I also control for education (1=graduate degree), age, gender 
(1=female), and race (1= non-White). 
Results 
 To test whether Americans respond to polling information from fellow Americans 
and whether these attitudes vary as a function of the size of the majority, I regressed support 
for the TPP on two experimental treatment dummy variables—respondents who received the 
poll that a slight majority (54%) of American support the TPP and the poll condition that a 
large majority (76%) of American support the TPP (the no-poll control condition serves as 
the reference category)—as well as my control variables. Looking at Table 1, I find no 
evidence of a bandwagon effect for either the slight majority condition (b = 0.00, s.e. = 0.04, 
p > 0.95) or the large majority condition (b = 0.03, s.e. = 0.04, p > 0.40). These null results 
reveal that the bandwagon effect does not seem to work for a large social group like 
Americans, nor does it matter whether the majority in support of the issue is slight or large. It 
is interesting that, unlike in the Canadian study (Clautier, Guay, & Nadeau, 1993), nationalist 
source cues were not enough to activate the bandwagon effect. This may be due to the 
relative homogeneity of the Canadian population as compared to that of the United States. In 
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other words, Canadian subjects may feel less social distance between themselves and “all 
Canadians” than American subjects feel between themselves and “all Americans.” 
Study 2 
Study 1 allowed me to test the general bandwagon effect for a trade issue and a large 
social group such as Americans. However, polling information is often presented with more 
cohesive and politically relevant social groups such as Democrats and Republicans. Because 
I found no support for the bandwagon effect in the “Americans support” poll conditions in 
Study 1, I replaced those conditions with partisan support poll conditions in Study 2. This 
provided tests of hypothesis 2, that partisans will change their issue attitudes to conform to 
the attitudes of majority of their fellow partisans, and hypothesis 2a, that independents would 
not change their issue attitudes to conform to those of any partisan group. By splitting the 
partisan support poll conditions into two groups—one in which subjects received the 
opinions of a slight majority of partisans, and one in which subjects received the opinions of 
a strong majority of partisans—Study 2 also provided a test of hypothesis 3, that the strength 
of group opinion moderates the impact of the bandwagon effect. 
Data 
A total of 302 adult subjects were recruited on-line via MTurk. Fifty-nine percent of 
subjects were male, and ages ranged from 18 to 83 years old (median age = 28 years old). 
Eighty-three percent of respondents identified their race as White, 8% as Asian, 4% as 
African American, 3% as Latino, and the remaining subjects selected “Other.” Thirty-eight 
percent identified themselves as Democrats, 20% as Republicans, and 42% as Independents. 
Similarly, 46% of the sample held liberal views, 34% moderate views, and 20% conservative 
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views. Forty-one percent of subjects reported that they had earned a bachelor’s degree or 
higher. The sample includes respondents from 43 states (including the District of Columbia). 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four fictional news articles about 
the TPP (for the exact wording, see Appendix A). As in Study 1, the key experimental 
manipulation concerned the extent to which partisans (Democrats vs. Republicans) supported 
the TPP (e.g., a “slight majority,” or 54%, vs. a “large majority,” or 76%). After subjects in 
the treatment groups viewed the polling information, they completed a brief post-article 
questionnaire assessing their support for the proposed free trade agreement, as well as some 
demographic questions and political knowledge items. 
Measures 
 Dependent variable. I used the same three-item dependent variable from Study 1. For 
ease of interpretation, the resulting variable was then rescaled from 0 to 1 (α = 0.94, M = 
0.56, SD = 0.21), as were all independent variables (except for age). 
 Independent variables. First, I created a social identity “match” dummy variable, 
which takes a value of 1 when there is a match between the partisan polling information and 
subjects’ self-reported party identification. For example, a self-identified Democrat who 
received the polling information that Democrats supported the TPP would be assigned a 
value of 1. Mismatches serve as the reference category, which includes all self-identified 
Independents, since they never received a matching poll. Second, I created a dummy variable 
for the size of the partisan majority, for which a large majority (76%) was assigned a value of 
1, and the slight majority (54%) serves as the reference category. 
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As in Study 1, the models also include the same set of control variables: party 
identification (1 = strong Republicans), ideology (1 = very conservative), political knowledge 
(1 = high knowledge; KR-20 = 0.74, M = 0.64, SD = 0.27), education (1=graduate degree), 
age, gender (1=female), and race (1= non-White). 
Results 
To begin, I test the general partisan bandwagon effect by regressing support for the 
TPP on the partisan match dummy variable, as well as a set of control variables. Looking at 
Column 1, Table 2, I find a significant main effect for the match variable (b = 0.05, s.e. = 
0.03, p < 0.05), such that being in the matching poll condition increases support for the TPP. 
In other words, Democrats and Republicans were significantly swayed by the partisan source 
cues presented by the opinion polls.  
Next, I test whether the partisan polling bandwagon effect varies as a function of the 
size of the in-group majority. To this end, I regressed support for the TPP on the partisan 
match and size of majority dummy variables, as well as their interaction and a set of control 
variables. A significant interaction would indicate that the size of the in-group majority does 
in fact moderate the social identity matching effect. Looking at the results presented in 
Column 2, Table 2, I find no evidence that the size of the in-group majority moderates the 
partisan bandwagon effect (b = 0.07, s.e. = 0.05, p > 0.20). This suggests that while partisans 
follow their group on political issues, the size of the majority is unimportant. 
Interestingly, respondents appear completely unaware of the influence of partisan 
group cues from the public opinions polls. When asked to “briefly describe the most 
important reason why [they] believe that Congress should support or oppose the Trans-
Pacific Partnership,” only one of the 302 subjects acknowledged the influence of the opinion 
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poll stating: “I’m just so strongly inclined to agree with Democratic beliefs.” Each of the 
remaining respondents claimed that his or her decision to support or oppose the TPP was 
based on some aspect of the arguments presented in the article. Thus, it is clear that the 
bandwagon effect went unnoticed by the vast majority of subjects. 
Study 3 
 While Study 1 and Study 2 allowed me to test a number of hypotheses regarding the 
bandwagon effect’s impact on public opinion, their somewhat complex designs ultimately 
undermined the statistical power of their results. Thus, I designed Study 3 as a more 
streamlined version of the experiment. As in Study 2, I eliminated the two “Americans 
support” conditions because the opinions of Americans elicited no bandwagon effect in 
Study 1. I also eliminated the “slight support” conditions from both the Republican and 
Democrat support polls as the strength of the opinion polls had no statistical impact on the 
bandwagon effect in Study 2 (hypothesis 3). Thus, Study 3 provided a streamlined and 
statistically powerful version of the previous studies, designed to replicate the findings of 
Study 2.  
Data  
A total of 461 subjects were recruited on-line via MTurk. Fifty-seven percent of 
subjects were male, and ages ranged from 19 to 75 years old (median age = 29 years old). 
Eighty-three percent identified their ethnicity as White, 7% as Asian, 4% as African 
American, 4% as Latino, and 1% as “Other.” Thirty-nine percent identified themselves as 
Democrats, 16% as Republicans, and 45% as Independents, while 48% of the sample held 
liberal views, 35% moderate views, and 18% conservative views. Twelve percent of subjects 
reported that high school was the highest level of education they had completed, while 41% 
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had earned a bachelor’s degree or higher. The sample includes respondents from 49 states 
(with the exception of Alaska) and the District of Columbia. In short, the demographic 
characteristics of the pool of subjects for Study 3 nearly mirrored that of the pools for Study 
1 and Study 2.  
Procedure 
 Because the size of the in-group majority did not moderate the bandwagon effect, 
subjects were randomly assigned to read one of three versions of the fictional TPP news 
article: 1) The “Democrat” polling condition shows that a majority (74%) of Democrats 
support the U.S. plan to join the TPP, while a majority of Republicans (71%) oppose it; 2) 
the “Republican” polling condition shows that a majority (74%) of Republicans support the 
US plan to join the TPP while a majority of Democrats (71%) do not; and 3) the control 
condition did not provide any polling information. After subjects viewed the polling 
information, they completed a post-article questionnaire nearly identical to that of Studies 1 
and 2. 
Measures 
 Dependent variable. I used the same three-item dependent variable from Study 1, 
with the exception that the support for TPP item was presented on a seven-point scale. For 
ease of interpretation, the resulting variable was then rescaled from 0 to 1 (α = 0.95, M = 
0.53, SD = 0.24), as were all independent variables (except for age). 
Independent variables. As an alternative measure of social identity, I created a 
differenced feeling thermometer rating toward the parties (each on a scale from 0 to 10), so 
that positive scores indicated favorable responses toward Republicans. The resulting variable 
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was recoded from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating extremely favorable feelings toward Republicans. 
This measure should provide a more nuanced assessment of subjects’ partisanship. 
As in Studies 1 and 2, the models also include the same set of control variables: party 
identification (1 = strong Republicans), ideology (1 = very conservative), political knowledge 
(1 = high knowledge; KR-20 = 0.73, M = 0.66, SD = 0.27), education (1=graduate degree), 
age, gender (1=female), and race (1= non-White). 
Results 
 To test whether partisan source cues moderate the polling bandwagon effect, I 
regressed support for the TPP on the poll condition dummy variables (the Democratic poll 
condition serves as the reference category), social identification—either party identification 
(Model 1) or feeling thermometer ratings (Model 2)— as well as the interactions of poll 
conditions and social identification, plus demographic control variables. A significant 
interaction would indicate that there is a partisan bandwagon effect. Looking at the results 
presented in Column 1, Table 3, I find a significant interaction for self-identified partisans in 
the Republican poll condition, b = 0.45, s.e. = 0.14, p < 0.01, as well as a marginally 
significant interaction for those in the control condition, b = 0.25, s.e. = 0.13, p < 0.10. When 
substituting the differenced feeling thermometer ratings for party identification, the results 
remain robust: The results presented in Column 2, Table 3 reveal significant interactions for 
those in the Republican poll condition, b = 0.53, s.e. = 0.15, p < 0.01, as well as a marginally 
significant interaction for those in the control condition, b = 0.35, s.e. = 0.15, p < 0.05. 
To explicate these results further, I calculated predicted values of support for the TPP 
by poll condition and party identification (see Table 4) and differenced feeling thermometer 
ratings (see Table 5). Figure 1 (TPP support by poll condition and party identification) and 
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figure 2 (TPP support by poll condition and differenced feeling thermometer ratings) visually 
illustrate my findings. Perhaps the most interesting result of the analysis is that, for both 
Democrats and Republicans, nearly all of the statistical power of the bandwagon effect is in 
the negative direction—that is, partisans appear to be “jumping off” the bandwagon when 
their preferred group does not support the issue. In order to test the directionality of the 
bandwagon effect, I conducted simple slope analyses on the results of both models. For 
Republicans, there are no significant differences in the predicted values of TPP support 
between the Republican Poll and control conditions in either model (in Model 1, p > 0.30; in 
Model 2, p > 030). However, when there is a mismatch in social identity, there are significant 
differences between the Democratic Poll and control conditions (in Model 1, p < 0.05; in 
Model 2, p < 0.01), and the Republican Poll and Democratic Poll conditions (in Model 1, p < 
0.01; in Model 2, p < 0.01). 
Likewise, for Democrats, there are no significant differences in the predicted values 
of supporting the TPP between the Democratic Poll and control conditions (in Model 1 p > 
0.20; in Model 2, a marginally significant difference of p < 0.10 exists). Once again, 
however, when there is a social identity mismatch, there are significant differences between 
the Republican Poll and control conditions (in Model 1 p < 0.01; in Model 2, p < 0.001). 
These results suggest that partisans are much more susceptible to source cues in opinion polls 
showing that their out-group supports an issue and their in-group opposes it than if their in-
group supports a measure and their out-group opposes it. In other words, partisans are much 
more likely to jump off the bandwagon with their fellow partisans to oppose a measure than 
to jump on the bandwagon with their fellow partisans to support it. 
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Once again, respondents are completely unaware of the influence of partisan group 
cues provided by public opinion polls. Only two of the 461 subjects acknowledged any 
influence of the polling information on their political attitudes. One declared: “It must be a 
good idea to join it if Republicans oppose it;” the other claimed: “Because only 29% of the 
Republicans want it. I agree with the 71% of Republicans who oppose. So I oppose, too.” 
Similar to the Study 2, each of the remaining respondents claimed that his or her decision to 
support or oppose the TPP was based on some aspect of the arguments presented in the 
article. Thus, Study 2 provides clear support for the hypothesis that, while people often base 
their political attitudes on the reported attitudes of like-minded others, they do not recognize 
that they do so. In other words, people believe that they form attitudes based on logical 
reasoning when, in fact, they form attitudes based on their need to reinforce their own social 
identities. Combined, the results of both studies show that only 0.3% of subjects recognize 
the impact of the bandwagon effect.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Recently, public opinion polls have become a staple of political news coverage. Radio 
and television programs, newspapers, magazines, and internet sites conduct polls and report 
their results literally around the clock. Members of the public often assume that these polls 
are scientific, unbiased, and accurate, and use them to shape their perceptions of general 
public opinion. For over 50 years, however, political scholars have openly worried about the 
accuracy of the polls reported by the media. The recent increase in the polarization of the 
news media has exacerbated those worries, as media outlets seeking to promote specific 
political agendas can attempt to manipulate public opinion by selecting which polls to ignore 
and which polls to disseminate. This research sought to investigate the potential negative 
effects of public opinion polls. Specifically, it asked: Do polls influence public opinion? 
 The tendency for individuals to change their political attitudes to conform to the 
majority of public opinion is known as the “bandwagon effect.” Psychologically, the 
bandwagon effect works by activating an individual’s desire to reinforce his or her social 
identity. Social identity theory and self-categorization theory explain that people seek to 
forge identities based on solidarity rather than alienation. The act of conforming to a group’s 
norms or beliefs (i.e., altering one’s attitude toward a political issue to conform to the 
majority of group members) leads to an increase in self-esteem, a feeling of belonging, and a 
sense of meaning in an otherwise meaningless world.  
 Only two previous studies have tested the impact of the bandwagon effect in the 
context of political attitudes. A Canadian study that presented subjects with the opinions of 
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“fellow Canadians” found strong support for the bandwagon effect, while a Belgium study 
that presented subjects with opinions of “others” found none. Unfortunately, while each 
study tested the extent to which public opinion moves public attitudes, neither study 
investigated the psychological mechanisms underlying the bandwagon effect. Within the 
contexts of social identity theory and self-categorization theory, the seemingly contradictory 
results are not contradictory at all. Rather, they support the linkage between the 
psychological theories and the bandwagon effect. In short, social identity theory and self-
categorization theory explain why Canadian subjects would adjust their attitudes to conform 
to those of fellow Canadians, while Belgium subjects would not adjust their attitudes to 
conform to those of nondescript others.  
In this research, I attempted to reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings of those 
two previous studies by designing and conducting three experiments that investigated the 
impact of the bandwagon effect in varying contexts of social identity. In each study, I 
presented subjects with an article describing the debate over the Trans Pacific Partnership, a 
new complex issue, and manipulated both the strength and sources of opinion data that 
subjects received. 
Study 1 returned mixed support for my hypotheses. Unexpectedly, the bandwagon 
effect had no significant impact on subjects who received polling information about the 
opinions of Americans. However, the bandwagon effect did have a significant impact on both 
Democrats and Republicans who received partisan polling information. The difference 
between the American and partisan poll conditions underscores the vital role of social 
identity as a moderator of the bandwagon effect. As opposed to Canadians, who moderated 
their issue positions in order to conform to those of other Canadians, Americans may feel far 
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enough removed from other Americans that they exhibit no desire to conform to national 
opinion. However, when polling data reflect the opinions of a much more intimate group, 
fellow partisans, Americans do change their issue attitudes. The fact that self-described 
political independents did not experience the bandwagon effect in either partisan poll 
condition provides further support for the linkage between social identity and the bandwagon 
effect. Like the subjects in the Belgium study who received the opinions of nondescript 
“others,” independent subjects in this study felt no desire to conform to the opinions of 
groups with which they do not identify.  
Interestingly, contrary to my third hypothesis, the strength of partisan support 
revealed by the polling data does not moderate the impact of the bandwagon effect. Polls 
showing the issue preferences of a strong majority of partisans did not affect subjects’ issue 
positions any more than those showing the preferences of a slight majority of partisans. In 
other words, partisan subjects tended to conform to the majority position of their own party, 
regardless of the strength of that majority. Finally, an open-ended item that asked subjects 
why they chose to support or oppose the TPP revealed that the vast majority of subjects did 
not recognize the impact of the bandwagon effect. 
I conducted Study 2 with an eye toward replicating the results of Study 1 and 
strengthening the statistical power of my results. As the strength of public opinion presented 
in opinion polls did not significantly impact the bandwagon effect, and as the American 
condition did not elicit a bandwagon effect, I streamlined the design of the study by 
separating subjects into only three treatment conditions and focusing on the three hypotheses 
that found support in Study 1. The streamlined design provided strong statistical support for 
each of the three hypotheses. Partisans felt the impact of the bandwagon effect and altered 
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their attitudes to conform to those of other partisans; independents did not feel the impact of 
the bandwagon effect; and only two of the 461 subjects stated that they based their decisions 
to support or oppose the TPP on the basis of the polling data. In short, partisans do use polls 
as heuristics, but they do so unknowingly. Although they believe that they form their issue 
attitudes based on logical and somewhat objective analyses of the merits of an issue, they 
actually form those attitudes out of a need to conform to the attitudes of their fellow 
partisans. Interestingly, almost all of the statistical power was generated by polls revealing 
in-group opposition and out-group support for the TPP. This suggests that, rather than 
jumping on the bandwagon, partisans are much more inclined to jump off.  
While this research establishes the link between the bandwagon effect and social 
identity, particularly in the context of partisan in-groups, its relatively limited scope leaves 
many questions unanswered. Specifically, does the bandwagon effect impact the issue 
positions of members of racial, religious, or ethnic groups in the same way that it impacts 
political partisans? The difference in the results returned by the American poll and partisan 
poll conditions suggests that some intimacy threshold must be met in order to activate the 
bandwagon effect. Does that threshold have to do with the perceived size of an in-group or 
its relative uniformity? Moreover, this research design did not present subjects in the 
American poll condition with the opposing views of a perceived out-group. Previous research 
has shown that the presence of an out-group increases an individual’s desire to conform to 
the social norms of his or her in-group (Cohen, 2003). The null results returned by the two 
American conditions, therefore, could be artifacts of the experimental design. Future studies 
should investigate this by providing Americans with an out-group poll. Moreover, this 
research design tested the bandwagon effect’s impact in the context of a new issue that did 
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not fall neatly along partisan lines. Future research should investigate the bandwagon effect 
in the context of issues for which partisans have clearly established preferences. It may also 
be interesting to examine the bandwagon effect in the context of facts as opposed to issue 
preferences. Often in today’s news environment, polls reflect the public’s opinion on basic 
facts (the science behind global warming; the percentage of the federal budget devoted to 
welfare, etc.). Might the opinions of a perceived in-group alter an individual’s perception of 
basic facts? Continuing studies should investigate the nature of polls as presented in today’s 
partisan news environment. A content analysis of the news media would reveal the types of 
groups typically represented by polling numbers.  
Finally, many political scholars tend to criticize this type of experimental approach 
for its inability to test the lasting effects of the experimental manipulation. However, I 
believe that this issue is particularly well-suited for such a design. First, the importance of the 
initial news frame of an issue has been well documented. Once people—partisans in 
particular—establish a position on an issue, reframing is often extremely difficult (Entman 
2004; Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schweider, & Rich, 2000). Moreover, because the 24-hour 
news cycle continually repeats itself, viewers are typically exposed to the same polling data 
multiple times a day. Such repeated exposure should increase the durability of the 
bandwagon effect.  Finally, the very nature of the findings highlights the importance of the 
first opinion poll to which partisans are exposed. As more and more individuals see polls 
revealing in-group partisan beliefs, they will modify their own issue positions to conform to 
those beliefs. Future polls, in turn, will reflect that modification.  
In today’s highly-partisan and poll-driven media environment, the results of this study 
on the bandwagon effect hold dire implications for the function of America’s representative 
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democracy. Researchers have demonstrated that public opinion drives public policy. 
Ironically, the very same polls that influence public opinion also influence the actions of 
political elites, who use them to derive a general sense of the public’s attitude toward specific 
issues and policies. If polls do, in fact, influence public opinion as this study suggests, then 
they represent much more than pieces of objective information; they represent a crucial cog 
in a rather insidious cycle in which polls alter future polls and, in turn, influence 
policymakers.  
 Finally, perhaps the most meaningful implication of this research is what it suggests 
about our typical approach to campaign-driven representative politics. A number of studies 
have already shown that people are rarely persuaded to change their existing attitudes or 
beliefs solely by a logical presentation of the merits of an issue (Cohen, 2003; Westen, 2007). 
If, as this study suggests, people change their attitudes to strengthen their group identity, then 
political persuasion is much more about crafting a positive group identity than debating issue 
particulars. In short, political parties should focus primarily on clarifying and strengthening 
their own brand names. The best way to attract Independents, those frequently sought 
“persuadable voters,” may not be to identify and take positions on wedge issues; rather, it 
may be about providing a positive group identity with which Independents want to identify. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
The Article 
 
Congress Debates Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement    
 
This week, the United States International Trade Commission finalized negotiations on what would be 
the largest international free trade agreement in history—if Congress ratifies it. The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (or TPP) would knock down tariff and non-tariff barriers between the United States and 
eight of Asia's fastest-developing economies. Specifically, the agreement will eliminate 95% of all 
import tariffs between the countries by January 1, 2016. It will also eliminate all import license 
requirements and enforce stricter exchange rate management policies to increase foreign investment 
between the countries. Proponents of the plan believe that it will lend a firm hand to a struggling 
United States economy. Others, however, are not so sure. With a vote scheduled on the floor of 
Congress two weeks from today, supporters and defenders of the plan are digging in for what is sure 
to be a vicious fight.  
 
Supporters of the TPP claim that it will create jobs in the United States, lower the cost of certain 
consumer goods, open up opportunities for American investors and keep the U.S. competitive with 
China in a vital world region. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that the TPP would actually cost 
the United States jobs, encourage investors to take their money out of U.S. markets, and strengthen 
foreign economies much more so than our own. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this debate is that it does not fall neatly along partisan lines. 
Republican George Forester, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs committee, for example, claims 
that the TPP is "a no-brainer." He says, "When American companies sell more overseas, American 
businesses can employ more people." But Graham Hartwell, a Republican on the same committee, 
disagrees. "No one disputes that the TPP will increase American exports," he said. "But that can go 
two ways. Sure, we'll be exporting more goods, but we'll also be exporting more jobs."  
 
Congressional Democrats are similarly split on the proposal. Greg Olson, a Democrat on the House 
Ways and Means Committee, claims that the TPP will "give American investors a chance to take part 
in one of the world's fastest growing economic regions." His Democratic colleague on the House 
Appropriations Committee, Brad Levinson, disagrees. "We should be encouraging American investors 
to invest in America," Levinson said. "Not overseas."  
 
Ron Kirk, the United States Trade Representative who spearheaded the TPP negotiations, 
understands why this is such a difficult debate for Congress. "The issues here are not easily labeled 
'liberal' or 'conservative,'" he said. "Obviously, I negotiated the deal. I think it will help Americans more 
than it hurts them. But that's up to Congress now." Without clear ideological cues, members of 
Congress may have to rely even more heavily than usual on the opinions of their constituents. 
Perhaps Harold Herschlog, a Congressman from Maryland, put it best: "I represent the people," he 
said. "I'm going to wait and see what they think." 
 
38 
 
Additional Information by Experimental Treatment Condition 
Americans Support Poll/Slight Majority (Study 1) 
 
With so much of the debate up to public opinion, USA Today conducted a poll of 1,454 Americans to 
see how they feel about the issue.  
 
Given the complexity of the debate, public opinion is mixed. A slight majority of Americans--54%--say 
they want Congress to pass the TPP, while 46% oppose the plan. 
 
 
Americans Support Poll/Large Majority (Study 1) 
With so much of the debate up to public opinion, USA Today conducted a poll of 1,454 Americans to 
see how they feel about the issue. 
  
Surprisingly, given the complexity of the debate, public opinion is clear. A large majority of 
Americans—76%--want Congress to pass TPP, while only 24% oppose the plan. 
 
  
A Slim Majority of 
AMERICANS SUPPORT 
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
54% 
support 
46% 
oppose 
An Overwhelming Majority of 
AMERICANS SUPPORT  
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
76% 
support 
24% 
oppose 
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Republican Support Poll/Large Majority (Study 2) & Republican Support Poll (Study 3) 
With so much of the debate up to public opinion, USA Today conducted a poll of 726 Democrats and 
744 Republicans to see how partisans feel about the issue.  
Surprisingly, given the complexity of the debate, the partisan divide among the public is clear. 76% of 
Republicans say they want the U.S. to join the TPP--compared to only 29% of Democrats. 
 
Republican Support Poll/Slight Majority (Study 2) 
 
With so much of the debate up to public opinion, USA Today conducted a poll of 726 Democrats and 
744 Republicans to see how partisans feel about the issue.  
 
Given the complexity of the debate, public opinion is mixed. 54% of Republicans say they want the 
U.S. to join the TPP--compared to 42% of Democrats. 
 
  
An Overwhelming Majority of 
REPUBLICANS SUPPORT  
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
76% 
support 
24% 
oppose 
An Overwhelming Majority of 
DEMOCRATS OPPOSE 
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
71% 
oppose 
29% 
support 
A Slim Majority of 
REPUBLICANS SUPPORT 
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
54% 
support 
46% 
oppose 
A Slim Majority of 
DEMOCRATS OPPOSE 
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
58% 
oppose 
42% 
support 
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Democrat Support Poll/Large Majority (Study 2) and Democrat Support Poll (Study 3) 
 
With so much of the debate up to public opinion, USA Today conducted a poll of 726 Democrats and 
744 Republicans to see how partisans feel about the issue. 
 
Surprisingly, given the complexity of the debate, the partisan divide among the public is clear. 76% of 
Democrats say they want the U.S. to join the TPP--compared to only 29% of Republicans. 
 
 
Democrat Support Poll/Slight Majority (Study 2) 
 
With so much of the debate up to public opinion, USA Today conducted a poll of 726 Democrats and 
744 Republicans to see how partisans feel about the issue.  
 
Given the complexity of the debate, public opinion is mixed. 54% of Democrats say they want the 
U.S. to join the TPP--compared to 42% of Republicans. 
 
 
  
An Overwhelming Majority of 
DEMOCRATS SUPPORT  
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
76% 
support 
24% 
oppose 
An Overwhelming Majority of 
REPUBLICANS OPPOSE 
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
71% 
oppose 
29% 
support 
A Slim Majority of 
DEMOCRATS SUPPORT 
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
54% 
support 
46% 
oppose 
A Slim Majority of 
REPUBLICANS OPPOSE 
the U.S. Joining the TPP 
58% 
oppose 
42% 
support 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Test of the Polling Bandwagon Effect for the Social 
Group “Americans” 
Experimental Treatment  
Slight Majority of Americans (54%) Poll 
0.00 
(0.04) 
Large Majority of Americans (76%) Poll 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Party Identification 
-0.16 
(0.11) 
Ideology 
0.19† 
(0.10) 
Female 
-0.16 
(0.11) 
Age 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Non-White 
0.02 
(0.04) 
Education 
0.08 
(0.07) 
Political Knowledge 
-0.12† 
(0.06) 
Intercept 
0.59** 
(0.07) 
R
2
 0.06 
Notes: N = 222. The dependent variable is a 3-item scale indicating 
support for the TPP. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression using 
robust standard errors. † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
 
 
42 
 
 
Table 2. Test of the Polling Bandwagon Effect for Partisan Social Groups 
(Study 2) 
 
Experimental Treatment   
Partisan Match 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
Size of Majority -- 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Match x Size of Majority Interaction -- 
0.07 
(0.05) 
Party Identification 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
Ideology 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
Female 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Age 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Non-White 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Education 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
Knowledge 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
Intercept 
0.59** 
(0.05) 
0.59** 
(0.05) 
   
R
2
 0.03 0.03 
Notes: N = 298. The dependent variable is a 3-item scale indicating support for the 
TPP. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression using robust standard errors. † p < 
0.10; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3. Test of the Polling Bandwagon Effect for Partisan Social 
Groups (Study 3) 
Republican Poll Condition 
-0.20** 
(0.06) 
-0.24** 
(0.07) 
Control Condition 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.13† 
(0.07) 
Party Identification (PID) 
-0.17 
(0.11) 
-- 
Republican Poll x PID Interaction 
0.45** 
(0.14) 
-- 
Control  x PID Interaction 
0.25† 
(0.137) 
-- 
Differenced Feeling Thermometer (FT) -- 
-0.19† 
(0.11) 
Republican Poll x FT Interaction -- 
0.53** 
(0.15) 
Control x FT Interaction -- 
0.35* 
(0.15) 
Ideology 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Female 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Age 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Non-White 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.08** 
(0.02) 
Education 
0.08† 
(0.05) 
0.09† 
(0.05) 
Knowledge 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Intercept 
0.60** 
(0.07) 
0.62 
(0.07) 
R
2 
0.07 0.07 
Notes: N = 451. The dependent variable is a 3-item scale indicating support for 
the TPP. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression using robust standard 
errors. † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4. Predicted Levels of Support for the TPP by Experimental 
Condition and Party Identification 
    
 Democratic 
Support Poll 
Republican 
Support Poll No Poll (Control) 
    
Republicans 0.43 0.67 0.59 
Independents 0.51 0.53 0.54 
Democrats 0.59 0.38 0.50 
    
 
 
 
Table 5. Predicted Levels of Support for the TPP by Experimental 
Condition and Differenced Feeling Thermometer Ratings 
    
 Democratic 
Support Poll 
Republican 
Support Poll No Poll (Control) 
    
Republicans 0.40 0.70 0.63 
Independents 0.50 0.52 0.55 
Democrats 0.60 0.36 0.47 
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Figure 1. Predicted Support for the TPP by Experimental Condition and Party Identification 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Support for the TPP by Experimental Condition and Differenced Feeling 
Thermometer Ratings 
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